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Abstract 
Co-speech gestures are an integral part of human face-to-face 
communication, but little is known about how pragmatic 
factors influence our comprehension of those gestures. The 
present study investigates how different types of recipients 
process iconic gestures in a triadic communicative situation. 
Participants (N = 32) took on the role of one of two recipients 
in a triad and were presented with 160 video clips of an actor 
speaking, or speaking and gesturing. Crucially, the actor’s eye 
gaze was manipulated in that she alternated her gaze between 
the two recipients. Participants thus perceived some messages 
in the role of addressed recipient and some in the role of 
unaddressed recipient. In these roles, participants were asked 
to make judgements concerning the speaker’s messages. Their 
reaction times showed that unaddressed recipients did 
comprehend speaker’s gestures differently to addressees. The 
findings are discussed with respect to automatic and 
controlled processes involved in gesture comprehension. 
Keywords: co-speech iconic gesture; eye gaze; recipient 
status; communicative intent; multi-party communication. 
Introduction 
When we speak, we frequently move our bodies to 
supplement what we say with co-speech gestures. A large 
proportion of these gestures are iconic in nature. 
Importantly, iconic gestures bear a close link with the 
speech that they accompany on semantic and temporal 
levels and have therefore been argued to constitute an 
integral part of human language (McNeill, 1992; Kendon, 
2004) and thus of speaker’s utterances (i.e., ‘composite 
utterances’, Kendon, 2004). While iconic gestures have 
been shown to fulfill a variety of cognitive functions which 
appear to benefit the speaker him or herself (e.g., Chawla & 
Krauss, 1994; Hostetter, Alibali & Kita, 2007), there is a 
growing body of evidence that their production is also 
linked to the speaker’s communicative intent (Gerwing & 
Bavelas, 2004; Holler & Stevens, 2007; Kelly, Byrne & 
Holler, 2011; Özyürek, 2002).  
The comprehension of iconic gestures, especially with 
respect to the attribution of communicative intentions, has 
been considerably less well researched. What we do know is 
that iconic gestures successfully communicate semantic 
information and that recipients integrate this information 
with that contained in the accompanying speech (e.g., Holle 
& Gunter, 2007; Holler, Shovelton & Beattie, 2009; Kelly, 
Barr, Church & Lynch, 1999; Kelly, Kravitz & Hopkins, 
2004; Willems, Özyürek & Hagoort, 2007). However, one 
limitation of studies on the comprehension of gestures is 
that many of them have presented stimuli in isolation, that 
is, video clips showing iconic gestures (and sometimes a 
torso) but, crucially, no head or facial information, and 
those studies that have included the face have tended to 
focus on the lips. In face-to-face communication, however, 
gestures are not only accompanied by speech and mouth 
movements, but also by a multitude of additional nonverbal 
social cues. Instead of focusing our attention solely on 
speech and gesture when listening to someone speaking we 
are required to divide our cognitive resources in such a way 
that allows us to take in and combine all of those cues. How 
we process and comprehend iconic gestures in more situated 
contexts that are much closer to real life situations therefore 
remains a wide-open issue.  
Of particular interest in this respect is the influence of eye 
gaze, one of the most powerful nonverbal social cues 
(Pelphrey & Perlman, 2009; Senju & Johnson, 2009). Eye 
gaze is not only an omnipresent contextual cue when 
observing co-speech gestures, it is also inherently linked to 
the perception of communicative intent (Kampe, Frith & 
Frith, 2003; Schilbach et al., 2006) and the regulation of 
social interaction (Argyle & Cook, 1976; Goodwin 1981; 
Kendon, 1967). This begs the question of how the co-
occurrence of gaze and gesture influences recipients’ 
comprehension. The present study addresses this very 
question.  
To do so, it builds on a couple of recent studies that have 
begun to focus on the issue of perceived communicative 
intent in conjunction with gesture comprehension. Kelly et 
al. (2007, 2010) showed that participants integrated co-
occurring information from speech and gesture less strongly 
when the two modalities were perceived as not intentionally 
coupled (e.g., male hands gesturing accompanied by a 
female voice speaking) than when they were perceived as 
intended to form a composite utterance (e.g., male hands 
gesturing accompanied by a male voice speaking). This is 
the first empirical evidence that the perceived intentional 
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stance of a communicator influences recipients’ processing 
of iconic gesture and speech.  
However, as many previous studies in this field, these two 
studies did not present gestures in their natural context but, 
instead, in isolation of any facial cues (including eye gaze) 
with the aim to control for the influence of lip movements. 
In addition, and in line with the predominant gesture 
comprehension paradigm at the time, both of the studies 
used mismatching speech-gesture stimuli, that is, stimuli in 
which the information provided by speech conflicted with 
that depicted by the accompanying iconic gestures. Whilst 
this was an ideal test bed for first enquiries into the semantic 
integration of speech and gesture, it compromises the 
generalisability of such findings to more natural speech-
gesture utterances, something the present study aims to 
overcome. 
Another recent study that has addressed the topic of 
communicative intent and gesture comprehension was 
conducted by Straube et al. (2010). In their study, 
participants watched video clips of a speaker who looked 
directly at them or who was oriented away from the camera. 
In contrast to previous studies on co-speech gesture 
comprehension, Straube et al.’s paradigm did include the 
speaker’s head and eye gaze, and, furthermore, they avoided 
the use of mismatching gestures. However, the authors 
manipulated multiple nonverbal social cues simultaneously 
(body/torso orientation, gesture orientation, as well as gaze 
direction), preventing us to draw conclusions about the 
effect of gaze direction specifically on participants’ 
comprehension. In addition, the information depicted by the 
gestures used as stimuli was redundant with that in speech 
(e.g., the speaker referred to a ‘round bowl’ in speech 
accompanied by a gesture depicting a round, bowl-like 
shape). It is therefore not possible to identify whether the 
differences in participants’ comprehension (measured in the 
form of their neural response and memory performance for 
the stimuli) between the two conditions (frontal/averted) 
was due to differences in their perception of speech, gesture, 
or a combination of the two. 
The studies by Kelly et al. (2007, 2010) and Straube et al. 
(2011) are laudable first attempts tapping the issue of 
communicative intent and gesture comprehension and useful 
stepping stones for further investigations on this topic. The 
present study aims to build on this work by investigating the 
effect of perceived communicative intent, as signaled 
through the speaker’s eye gaze direction, on the 
comprehension of iconic gestures. Importantly, this study 
will be presenting gestures in a more natural context 
(including the head), manipulating social eye gaze as the 
only social cue of interest, and it will be based on gestures 
that match the speech but which are complementary in 
nature. This, in conjunction with the particular experimental 
paradigm employed in this study, will allow us to tap into 
the processing of gesture directly, and to zoom into 
recipients’ processing of the verbal and the gestural 
components of the speaker’s messages separately. We will 
do so by creating a set-up simulating a triadic 
communicative situation involving one speaker and two 
recipients, combined with a manipulation of the speaker’s 
eye gaze direction which will indicate to participants when 
they are an addressed and when they are an unaddressed 
recipient. Thus, it is the first experimental study looking 
specifically on the effect of social eye gaze on speech and 
iconic co-speech gestures. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two female, right-handed German native speakers 
participated in the experiment (mean age = 21.6yrs) and 
were compensated with 8€ payment. 
Design 
The study employed an experimental paradigm simulating 
multi-party communication involving one speaker-gesturer 
and two recipients, only one of which was a ‘real’ 
participant (the other one was fictive). Participants were 
made to believe that the other participant taking on the role 
of the second recipient was located in a different room.  
A confederate acted as the speaker-gesturer and produced 
scripted utterances to a video camera (we used pre-recorded 
instead of live stimuli to ensure that all participants were 
presented with identical stimuli). These pre-recorded video 
clips were presented to participants while making them 
believe that they were engaging in a live communication 
with the speaker, who they thought was located in yet a 
different room to themselves but connected to them via a 
live camera link. (The second recipient was, allegedly, also 
connected to the person acting as speaker via a live-camera 
link, in the same way as they were.) 
To prevent participants from realising that the speaker 
was pre-recorded, they were told that the camera link was a 
one-way connection in that the two recipients were able to 
hear and see the speaker but that the speaker was not able to 
hear or see them (and the two recipients were, of course, not 
able to see or hear each other). They were also told that the 
speaker had been asked to stand in front of two different 
cameras, that she knew of the two recipients’ presence, and 
that she had been told that each camera was hooked up to 
one of the recipients’ computer monitors, allowing them to 
hear and see what she was communicating. In order to 
create a more plausible situation and convince subjects that 
the speaker did not memorise the entire set of scripted 
sentences by heart, the video clips showed the speaker 
looking down before each sentence was spoken; participants 
were told that a laptop had been positioned on a table in 
front of the speaker displaying a black and white drawing 
accompanied by a couple of words before each trial, and 
that the speaker had been instructed to communicate the 
contents of the information displayed on the screen 
spontaneously and in a way that felt natural to them (no 
explicit mention of gesture was made). They (the actual 
participants) were then informed that the speaker would 
sometimes address them by looking into the camera linked 
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to their own on monitor, and sometimes the other, second 
recipient, by looking into the respective other camera. This 
created two different views for the actual participant, one in 
which they were directly gazed at, and one in which they 
observed the speaker’s gaze being averted (see Fig 1). Gaze 
direction, as implemented through this manipulation, 
constituted our main IV (within-participants). In addition, as 
a second IV (modality), we manipulated the occurrence of 
gesture in association with the sentences spoken by the 
speaker in the video clips (within-participants). 
Stimuli 
The experiment set-up described in the preceding section 
required the creation of four types of video stimuli: a) Direct 
gaze (speech only), b) Averted gaze (speech only), c) Direct 
gaze (speech + gesture), d) Averted gaze (speech + gesture) 
(Fig. 1). In each video vignette, the actor spoke a short 
sentence (canonical SVO structure), e.g. ‘she goes through 
the list’ (‘sie geht durch die Liste’). Crucially, the verb 
included in the sentence was always manner unspecific, i.e., 
‘to go through’ (durchgehen). The iconic gestures 
accompanying these verbs always specified the manner of 
action, e.g., to tick items on the list (abhaken). This 
manipulation allowed us to measure participants’ 
comprehension of the gestures independently of speech, 
without using mismatching gestures (see Introduction). 
Participants watched the videos on a computer screen in a 
soundproof experimental test booth; the audio signal was 
presented via closed-back headphones. Materials were 




Figure 1: Examples of the four types of video stimuli 
used, A = Direct gaze (S only), B = Averted gaze (S only), 
C = Direct gaze (S + G), D = Averted gaze (S + G).  
Procedure 
First, participants completed six practice trials (showing a 
different actor). Before the start of the experiment proper, 
the experimenter made a fake phone call to check whether 
‘the other participants’ were ready to start.  
Participants then watched 160 videos (40 stimuli per 
condition). Each video clip was followed by a written word 
(presented in capital letters, centre of screen) that matched 
either the verb contained in the preceding spoken sentence 
(speech-related targets [20 items per condition]; designed to 
tap into the processing of the verbal component of the 
speaker’s message) or the content of the gesture performed 
by the speaker in the video (gesture-related targets [20 
items per condition]; designed to tap into the processing of 
the gestural component of the speaker’s message).  
Task 
Participants were asked to judge “whether the word 
displayed on the screen had been mentioned by the speaker 
in the preceding video”, thus requiring ‘yes’ answers for all 
speech-related targets, and ‘no’ answers for all gesture-
related targets. Reactions times (RTs) to participants’ yes/no 
answers (delivered via a button box; yes = dominant hand) 
as well as errors1 were recorded.  
Results 
RTs for gesture and speech-related targets were entered into 
two separate 2 (gaze: direct vs. averted) x 2 (modality: 
speech only vs. speech+gesture) repeated measures 
ANOVA, excluding errors (constituting 2% of the total 
number of trials) and outliers (2 SD).  
Speech-related targets 
Our first comparison concerned participants’ responses to 
the speech-related targets (e.g., ‘to go through’ 
(durchgehen)) designed to tap primarily into the processing 
of the verbal component of the speaker’s composite 
utterances. This analysis revealed a significant main effect 
of modality (p = .0001), with slower response times in the 
speech + gesture conditions than in the speech only 
conditions. The main effect of gaze was not significant (p = 
.090), and neither was the interaction between gaze and 
modality (p = .870).  
 
Figure 2: Addressed and unaddressed recipients’ (AR/UR) 
RTs (ms) in the speech-only and speech + gesture 
conditions for speech-related targets (error bars = SE). 
Gesture-related targets 
Our main comparison focused on participants’ responses to 
the gesture-related targets (e.g., ‘to tick’ (abhaken)) 
intended to tap primarily into the processing of the gestural 
                                                
1 Due to restrictions on space, we only report our RT results 
here. Note, however, that the error rate analysis revealed very few 
significant differences, and those that did emerge did not relate to 











component of the speaker’s composite utterances. This 
analysis revealed no main effect of modality (p = .216) and 
no main effect of gaze (p = .087). However, the interaction 
between gaze and modality was significant (p = .045). 
Independently from the omnibus interaction effect, we 
carried out two a priori contrasts (UR S+G vs. AR S+G; UR 
S-only vs. AR S-only). These showed that the interaction is 
driven by unaddressed recipients taking significantly longer 
to respond in the S+G condition than addressed recipients in 
the S+G condition (p = .026). The comparison of 
unaddressed and addressed recipients’ RTs in the speech-
only conditions was not significant. 
 
Figure 3: Addressed and unaddressed recipients’ (AR/UR) 
RTs (ms) in the speech-only and speech + gesture 
conditions for gesture-related targets (error bars = SE). 
Discussion 
The present study has investigated co-speech gesture 
comprehension in the presence of eye gaze, a powerful 
social cue integral to human face-to-face communication. 
Our findings reveal that recipients’ gesture comprehension 
is indeed influenced by the speaker’s eye gaze direction. 
More specifically, we have shown that, when a speaker’s 
eye gaze is used to signal communicative intent in the sense 
of address, recipients who are currently unaddressed (but 
ratified participants in a communication, Goffmann, 1981) 
do process speech-accompanying iconic gestures differently 
to addressed recipients. This finding advances our 
understanding of human communication by pointing to an 
important way in which pragmatic processes shape and 
influence the comprehension of co-speech gestures, which, 
to date, has been addressed by only a very small number of 
studies (Kelly et al., 1999, 2007, 2010; Straube et al., 2011). 
There are at least two competing interpretations of our 
effects of eye gaze direction on gesture comprehension. One 
is what we have termed the ‘Fuzzy Representation 
Hypothesis’. According to this hypothesis, due to 
unaddressed recipients perceiving the speaker’s gestures as 
not intended for them (but for the other, gazed at recipient 
instead), they interpret the gesture to a lesser degree. As a 
consequence, they take longer to respond to the gesture-
related targets because they have constructed merely a 
partial, or fuzzy, mental representation of the gestural 
meaning. They are aware that something relating to the 
meaning of the word displayed on the screen may have been 
presented to them, but they have a hard time making a quick 
decision on the modality in which this information was 
presented (since the gestural component of their mental 
representation is ‘incomplete’ or ‘fuzzy’). Further, we 
would argue that the underlying mechanism leading to this 
fuzzy representation would not simply be one of reduced 
attention. The reason for this is that, first, addressed and 
unaddressed recipients do not differ in the number of errors 
they made, and, second, the modality effect we found for the 
speech-related targets is as strong for unaddressed as for 
addressed recipients. Thus, our data suggest that 
unaddressed recipients do process the gestural information 
but less strongly so, and that the reason for this is a 
modulation of perceived communicative intent rather than a 
pure decrease in attention. 
An alternative possibility is what we have called the 
‘Competing Modalities Hypothesis’. The rationale 
underlying this account is that, while addressed recipients 
(in both dyadic and multi-party interactions) are expected to 
engage in mutual gaze with a speaker (Argyle & Dean, 
1976; Kendon, 1967), unaddressed recipients are free to 
disengage from the process of gazing at the speaker. This 
means that the default situation requires recipients who are 
directly addressed through a speaker’s gaze to split their 
attention between information coming from multiple 
modalities including speech, gesture, and gaze (and 
additional facial cues). Unaddressed recipients, on the other 
hand, have fewer visual social cues to process since the 
speaker’s gaze is averted from them. They may therefore 
zoom in on gesture, instead of processing gesture and gaze 
simultaneously, and may thus have more cognitive 
resources available to focus on the processing of gesture. As 
a consequence, in the current paradigm, unaddressed 
recipients are taking longer than addressed recipients to 
respond to the gesture-related targets (requiring a ‘no’ 
answer) because the gestural component of the speaker’s 
utterance constitutes a more prominent component of their 
mental representation of the event described (since they 
focused on gesture more). To declare something as not 
having been mentioned by the speaker despite the stronger 
memory trace of the gesture being at the forefront of their 
mind appears to be a difficult task. 
The present study was a fruitful undertaking as it has 
shown that recipient status can influence gesture processing, 
but also because it allowed us to formulate two possible 
accounts of a potential process model explaining those 
effects. Currently, we are unable to unequivocally declare 
one of them as the more appropriate one, but further studies 
are currently underway tackling this issue (this on-going 
research will also add further insights into participants’ 
visual fixations in the two recipient roles, and it tests 
recipients’ gesture comprehension avoiding the suppression 
of gestural information/no responses). That said, we believe 
that the Competing Modalities Hypothesis provides the 
more intuitive account, and some additional data we have 
collected speak to this preliminary conclusion, too: as a 
follow-up analysis, we obtained ratings for all of our stimuli 
from an independent set of participants which gave us an 
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insight into the degree of ambiguity/clarity of the individual 
gesture stimuli in the absence of speech. If the Fuzzy 
Representation Hypothesis should hold, gestures that are 
more ambiguous in the absence of speech (i.e., less 
pantomimic) should cause unaddressed recipients particular 
problems of interpretation (since they require more 
interpretation effort and more integration work). 
Unaddressed recipients should therefore have taken 
especially long to respond to those iconic gestures. 
However, when we correlated unaddressed recipients’ RTs 
with the ambiguity ratings of the individual gestures, no 
relationship of this sort was found. One could argue, of 
course, that more pantomimic gestures should slow 
unaddressed recipients down also if we assume that the 
Competing Modalities Hypothesis holds, since they might 
‘stick’ particularly well in the participant’s mind; that is, the 
gestural components of utterances accompanied by more 
pantomimic gestures might become particularly prominent 
parts of unaddressed recipients’ mental representations. 
However, this argument only holds if we assume that 
unaddressed recipients also integrate the verbal and the 
gestural information less than addressed recipients. 
According to the Fuzzy Representation Hypothesis, this 
would be the case, since processing the gestural information 
less well will also affect the integration of this information 
with speech. According to the Competing Modalities 
Hypothesis, however, unaddressed recipients may integrate 
speech and gesture to the same extent as addressed 
recipients, with the addition that they process the gestural 
information more strongly than them. Therefore, our 
favoured interpretation is the Competing Modalities 
Hypothesis, but further research is needed before we can 
draw firm conclusions.  
 
Automatic and controlled processes in gesture 
comprehension 
With regard to the difference in response patterns for the 
speech-related and gesture-related targets, our results also 
relate to the distinction between automatic and controlled 
processes in co-speech gesture comprehension (Kelly et al., 
2010). Bear in mind that these two sets of targets were 
designed to tap the processing of the speaker’s information 
in different ways. What is striking is that, in the case of 
speech-related targets - a comparatively easy task - we 
observed a clear modality effect, as has been demonstrated 
by previous comprehension studies. The semantic 
integration of gesture and speech has been argued to be 
automatic in the sense of a low-level, fast and obligatory 
process (Kelly et al., 2010; see also Kelly, Özyürek & 
Maris, 2010). This explanation would account for the 
intrusion of the gestural information (longer RTs in the 
speech + gesture conditions) despite participants here 
having been asked to judge the content of speech only. At 
the same time, the results show a lack of an effect of our 
gaze manipulation, indicating that this task (saying ‘yes’ in 
response to a visually presented word that was presented 
auditorily immediately prior to this) might have been so 
easily and quickly accomplished that higher-order processes 
involved in the processing of pragmatic information, and 
judgements of speaker-intentions in particular, may not have 
come into play.  
Responses to the gesture-related targets tell a different 
story, however. Here, participants were slower in general, 
indicating that this task might have been perceived as more 
difficult (i.e., saying ‘no’ to indicate that a certain meaning 
had not been mentioned by the speaker, despite the meaning 
of the word displayed on screen being related to the 
meaning in the speaker’s gesture). This seems plausible 
since participants here had to consult their mental 
representation more carefully by actively teasing apart what 
they heard and what they saw to arrive at a decision. In 
order to answer accurately, they were essentially required to 
suppress the gestural information they had received. This 
contrasts with the speech-target situation where intrusion of 
the gestural information may have slowed participants down 
since there was more information to process, but the 
gestural information did not interfere as such; after all, 
‘ticking’ items on a list is part of the event of ‘going 
through’ a list. To answer ‘yes’, which participants were 
required to do for speech-related targets, is still correct, even 
if the gestural information is taken into account. Answering 
‘no’ to the gesture-related targets involved a very different 
process, as it required the temporary suppression of the 
gestural information. Consequently, slower and more 
difficult information processing may have led to the 
involvement of more controlled, higher-order cognitive 
operations, which do take into consideration the intentional 
stance of a speaker.  
 
Effects of eye gaze direction on speech processing 
Our results reveal that speech comprehension was not 
different for addressed and unaddressed recipients2. One 
possibility therefore is that gesture comprehension processes 
are more sensitive to perceived communicative intent as 
signalled through a speaker’s gaze than the processing of 
speech is. However, we have to remain cautious with 
drawing such a conclusion from the present data. This is 
because the current paradigm required participants to judge 
speech (i.e., whether a certain word had been mentioned in 
the preceding clip). As a consequence, participants will have 
devoted much attention to the processing of speech, 
irrespective of their recipient status, since they were always 
required to respond. In other words, a paradigm that does 
not ask participants to explicitly devote attention to the 
verbal modality might reveal a modulation of eye gaze 
direction for the processing of speech only utterances also. 
In fact, based upon the Competing Modalities Hypothesis, 
                                                
2 The lack of an effect of recipient status on the processing of 
speech stands, at first sight, in slight contrast to a study by Schober 
& Clark (1989) who found overhearers to be slower and less 
accurate in their understanding of verbal references than 
addressees. However, in their study, overhearers were not official 
recipients of the communication, which distinguishes them from 
unaddressed recipients (Goffman, 1981). 
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one might expect to see such a modulation, since 
unaddressed recipients have more cognitive resources 
available that they are able to devote to the processing of 
speech. The present study was designed to mainly measure 
the processing of gesture, and future research is needed to 
provide more conclusive answers to the question of how 




In sum, our study suggests that recipients keep an eye on 
where speakers are looking, and this subtle piece of 
information has a significant impact on the extent to which 
co-speech gestures are processed. 
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